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INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 2015, Donald J. Trump called for a “total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.”1 News
outlets rushed to various legal scholars to determine whether a ban
from entering the United States based on a person’s religious views
would be legal. Some suggested that such a ban would violate the
First Amendment, even if applied to noncitizens.2 Yet others relied
on the Supreme Court’s precedent from 1889,3 Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, commonly known as the Chinese Exclusion Case, in
which the Court upheld the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 barring
Chinese laborers from entry into the United States.4
Indeed, a strict holding-based adherence to stare decisis, barely
scrutinized for over a century, would give the Court no option but to
uphold a ban on Muslims from entering the United States in 2018.5
1. Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump: Ban All Muslim Travel to U.S., CNN (Dec. 8, 2015,
4:18 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trump-muslim-ban-immigration/
[https://perma.cc/C8B4-HVTM].
2. See, e.g., Ivan Eland, Trump’s Ban on Muslims Is Unconstitutional and Obscures Real
Solution, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2015, 9:21 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ivan-
eland/ trumps-ban-on-muslims-is_b_8804284.html [https://perma.cc/ZA5M-JCXR].
3. See, e.g., Donald Trump’s Proposed Muslim Ban Is Likely Illegal but..., REUTERS (June
14, 2016, 10:30 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-muslims-ban-terrorism-radical-
islam-guns-orlando-shooting-legal-470470 [https://perma.cc/BT55-QMYZ]; Scott Greer, Law
Professors: Trump’s Muslim Moratorium Is Constitutional, DAILY CALLER (Dec. 12, 2015, 6:10
PM), http://dailycaller.com/2015/12/12/law-professors-trumps-muslim-moratorium-is-consti
tutional/ [https://perma.cc/5ERF-RYKG]; Ari Melber, Legal Scholar: Trump’s Muslim Ban Is
Probably Legal, MSNBC (Dec. 22, 2015, 6:28 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/trump-
muslim-ban-probably-legal [https://perma.cc/CJQ5-9EKD].
4. 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). This Note acknowledges that the terrorist attacks in Europe
and the United States in 2014 and 2015 provoked Donald Trump’s proposal. See Diamond,
supra note 1. To protect the nation in a state of war, the executive’s invoking of its war powers
may arguably justify a complete ban, even if it targets a religious group. However, this Note
focuses on the power to exclude aliens only by virtue of state sovereignty, or international law,
and not by the constitutional war powers delegated to the executive.
5. See also Margo Schlanger, Symposium: Could This Be the End of Plenary Power?,
SCOTUSBLOG (July 14, 2017, 9:45 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/symposium-end-
plenary-power/ [https://perma.cc/AQ5F-LNSY] (“Under the Chinese Exclusion Case, the
Trump Administration would win the current litigation over the travel-ban executive order
even if the president testified under oath in open court that his policy was motivated by anti-
Muslim animus—indeed, even if the executive order announced an explicit ban on admitting
Muslims, as candidate Trump first proposed.”)
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First, the conceptual framework of constitutional review in discrimi-
nation cases, such as whether discrimination against a particular
group requires strict- or heightened-scrutiny analysis, does not ap-
ply in the immigration context.6 Second, and more relevant to this
Note, although the Court’s approval of the Chinese Exclusion Act in
Chae Chan Ping barred entry based on a national security justifica-
tion premised on race or nationality rather than religion, such a dis-
tinction has no doctrinal significance.7 The doctrine established in
Chae Chan Ping—the plenary power doctrine—justifies bans based
on both race and national origin, and religion.8 In Chae Chan Ping,
the Court established the judiciary’s complete deference to the po-
litical branches’ immigration decisions.9 The doctrine’s current form,
established in 1972 and reaffirmed in 2015, merely asks whether an
exclusion is based on a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason.”10
This test could have also justified the Chinese exclusion in 1889, for
Chinese laborers were perceived as a national security threat.11 As
long as an exclusion is, on its face, related to the safety of the
nation, it seems that any group is susceptible to such a char-
acterization and is thus excludable.12 Even today, if the government
6. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 212 n.12 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Invidious discrim-
ination against a particular race or group by a public official is ... ordinarily ... inconsistent
with a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide reason’ for government action. However, ... no one
disputes [that] ‘Congress may employ race or national origin as criteria in determining which
aliens to exclude from the country.’” (quoting Vigile v. Sava, 535 F. Supp. 1002, 1016 (S.D.N.Y.
1982))).
7. See David G. Savage, Donald Trump’s Proposed Ban on Muslim Immigrants Could Be
Legal, Scholars Say, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2015, 11:15 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-
na-muslim-ban-legality-20151214-story.html [https://perma.cc/DBX9-68CM].
8. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606 (“[If Congress] considers the presence of
foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous
to its peace and security ... its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.”).
9. See id.
10. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2139-41 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972). For an earlier formulation of the
doctrine, see United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
11. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595. Although in that case, the outcome did not even
depend on the legitimacy of that threat. Id. at 606.
12. Professor Matthew J. Lindsay proposes that in certain contexts, the Court might reject
a national security rationale for judicial deference in immigration cases. Matthew J. Lindsay,
Immigration as Invasions: Sovereignty Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration
Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 54 n.245 (2010). Without rejecting the rationale, the
Ninth Circuit has held that it can review the constitutionality of executive actions intended
to improve national security. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2017)
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linked a person’s race or religion to national security concerns,
merely facially but with some rational support, the exclusion is
upheld.13
President Trump did not go so far as to explicitly ban an entire
religion14 when he passed his first executive order in January 2017
that prohibited the entry of refugees and citizens from seven Mus-
lim-majority countries for ninety days.15 Indeed, lower courts block-
ed Trump’s every attempt—a total of three—to keep out roughly 150
million aliens.16 The Supreme Court had been reluctant to step in,17
except when it granted the government’s application to stay in part
lower courts’ injunctions on Trump’s first order.18 But on January
19, 2018, the Court announced that it would hear the latest chal-
lenge to Trump’s third executive order arising out of the Ninth Cir-
cuit.19
Whatever happens in the Supreme Court, the plenary power
doctrine will survive. The Court’s take on the Ninth Circuit’s
holding20 in Hawaii v. Trump will not disturb the plenary power
(per curiam), cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 448 (2017).
13. This Note assumes that a person’s race or religion cannot act as a legitimate proxy to
detecting national security threats.
14. Trump’s order was, however, recognized as a “Muslim ban.” Josh Gerstein & Nolan
D. McCaskill, Trump Eases Up on Travel Ban with New Executive Order, POLITICO (Mar. 6,
2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/trump-releases-new-travel-ban-
executive-order-235720 [https://perma.cc/C78G-G9GD].
15. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8978 (2017). 
16. See Richard Gonzales, Supreme Court to Hear Latest Challenge to Trump’s Travel Ban,
NPR (Jan. 19, 2018, 7:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/19/57926
6481/scotus-to-hear-challenge-to-trump-s-travel-ban [https://perma.cc/ED28-YKAA].
17. Lydia Wheeler, Supreme Court Dismisses Final Case Against Trump Travel Ban, HILL
(Oct. 24, 2017, 5:35 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/356978-supreme-court-
dismisses-final-case-against-trump-travel-ban [https://perma.cc/DD3Q-TK77] (discussing the
Court’s orders of June and October 2017 to dismiss lawsuits challenging the ban because the
ban had expired and thus no “live case or controversy” existed).
18. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2017) (per curiam).
19. Gonzales, supra note 16; see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) (mem.);
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.). Another challenge
to the third executive order arising out of the Fourth Circuit has also been appealed to the
Supreme Court. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018),
petition filed, No. 17-1194 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2018). As this Note went into print, the Court had
reviewed the petition, but postponed its decision as to whether to grant certiorari. See Int’l
Refugee Assistance, 883 F.3d 233, appeal docketed, No. 17-1194 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2018)
(distributed for conference of March 23, 2018).
20. The Ninth Circuit’s substantive holdings were that the President’s third executive
order exceeded the scope of his delegated authority under section 1182(f) of the INA; even
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doctrine. First, the doctrine treats the exclusion of aliens as a
nonjusticiable question without regard to which political branch is
acting.21 The current “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” test
would thus also apply to the acts of the executive, even if an
Establishment Clause challenge is raised.22 Second, the doctrine
would survive even if the Court decided the case on statutory, or
nondelegation, grounds, as the Court would determine only whether
the executive exceeded its “conditional exercise” of “plenary
congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion.”23 And
assuming the President’s order did not exceed in scope, the President failed to satisfy the
requirements of section 1182(f); the President’s order violated section 1152(a)(1)(A) of the
INA; and the President lacked independent constitutional authority to issue the order. 
Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 690, 693-94, 697 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 923.
21. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“[T]he power to expel or exclude aliens as a
fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments [is]
largely immune from judicial control.” (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210
(1953))); United States  ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1950) (“The right
to [exclude] stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to
control the foreign affairs of the nation.... [T]he decision to admit or to exclude an alien may
be lawfully placed with the President .... The action of the executive ... is final and conclus-
ive.”); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“Whether a proper consid-
eration by our government of its previous laws, or a proper respect for the nation whose
subjects are affected by its action, ought to have qualified its inhibition and made it applicable
only to persons departing from the country after the passage of the act, are not questions for
judicial determination.”); Adam B. Cox & Christina M. Rodríguez, The President and
Immigration Law, 119 YALE. L.J. 458, 467 (2009).
22. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542 (considering the petitioner-alien’s exclusion during Second
World War and stating, “The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right
to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to
control the foreign affairs of the nation.”); see also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155,
188 (1993) (stating that the executive has “unique responsibility” for foreign and military
affairs (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936))). The major-
ity in the Fourth Circuit opinion, International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, began
its analysis of Trump’s third executive order by applying this test. 883 F.3d at 263 (“In assess-
ing Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause challenge, we first ask whether the proffered reason for
the Proclamation is ‘facially legitimate and bona fide.’” (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 770 (1972))). So did Judge Paul Niemeyer in his dissent, but he reached an opposite
conclusion. Id. at 364 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven assuming a constitutional violation
lurked beneath the surface of the Executive’s implementation of its statutory authority, the
reasons the Executive had provided were ‘facially legitimate and bona fide,’ so must we reject
this similar challenge today.”).
23. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972); see also, e.g., Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project, 883 F.3d at 289 (Gregory, J., concurring) (“Simply put, the Court does not
consider the ‘wisdom of the policy choices’ made by the President. Instead, ‘we must decide
only whether’ the Proclamation, ‘which reflects and implements those choices, is consistent
with’ the INA.” (quoting Sale, 509 U.S. at 165-66)). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit struck down
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third, the doctrine would remain untouched if the Court decided the
case on separation of powers grounds, as the issue would be whether
the executive had constitutional authority, either independently or
by the implied or express will of Congress, to issue the executive
order.24
Instead of finding ways around the plenary power doctrine by ap-
pealing to statutory frameworks or constitutional power-allocation
theories, this Note tackles the doctrine head on. This Note goes fur-
ther than the President’s “thinly-veiled Muslim ban” and analyzes
a twenty-first century race-based exclusion, promulgated either by
Congress or the executive, under the plenary power doctrine.25 In
analyzing the exclusion, this Note argues that the command of Chae
Chan Ping is not its holding, the doctrine establishing deference,
but its law. Instead of continuing to deform the doctrine through ar-
bitrary and inherently subjective means26—efforts that have made
the executive order on statutory grounds. Hawaii, 878 F.3d at 673 (“We conclude that the
President’s issuance of the Proclamation once again exceeds the scope of his delegated
authority.”).
24. See Hawaii, 878 F.3d at 697-98 (“We therefore must determine whether the President
has constitutional authority to issue the Proclamation, independent of any statutory grant—
for if he has such power, it may be immaterial that the Proclamation violates the INA.”); see
also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
25. Gerstein & McCaskill, supra note 14.
26. Professor Hiroshi Motomura, a renowned international law scholar, characterizes the
courts’ ways around the plenary power doctrine as an improper reliance on “phantom constitu-
tional norms.” Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phan-
tom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1990). For
criticisms of the Court’s persistent failures to analyze immigration decisions under a
traditional constitutional analysis by applying either rational basis or strict scrutiny, see
Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional
Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 58 (1998) (claiming that the plenary power prece-
dents “are inconsistent with due process and equal protection”); Louis Henkin, The
Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny,
1988 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 115, 124 [hereinafter Henkin, The Constitution and United
States Sovereignty] (claiming that no theory, including the plenary power doctrine, is
exempted from constitutional restraints); Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as
Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 32 (1985)
(claiming that the Constitution requires the U.S. government to respect the rights of human
beings everywhere); and Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993
WIS. L. REV. 965, 1028 (suggesting that because “the theoretical basis for Chinese Exclusion
and its progeny [is] gone, the Court should insist that the political branches apply
constitutional rights evenhandedly with respect to both citizens and aliens”); see also, e.g.,
Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction for
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little to no progress over the past 130 years—this Note suggests that
the Court revisit Chae Chan Ping, reaffirm its source of law, and
enforce that law. That law, however, is international law.
The plenary power doctrine, which first excluded Chinese laborers
on the basis of their race and nationality, is condemned for its racist
and derogatory origins.27 But even though the foundation of the doc-
trine was fueled by xenophobic moods and created in an anachronis-
tic worldview, its premises are still largely relevant today.28 The
underlying legal concept—a sovereign nation’s inherent power to
exclude—is accepted as a given in today’s understanding of interna-
tional relations.29 Much of the critical scholarship has focused on
eliminating the plenary power doctrine and thus pressed the Court
to analyze immigration issues under traditional constitutional
review.30 A sovereign state’s domestic law may, and likely does, im-
pose direct limitations on its authority to exclude foreign aliens, but
such authority—rooted in international law—is not itself unlimited
despite domestic law’s restraints.31 Since the Court impliedly
approved Congress’s act to bar “vast hordes of [Chinese] crowding
in upon”32 the United States based on international law, that law
has gone through major changes, primarily by placing limitations
on a sovereign’s power to exclude. Accordingly, this Note argues that
the plenary power doctrine reflects international law norms.
Whereas in 1889, when the sovereign’s power to exclude based on
Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257,
287 (2000) (hypothesizing that the plenary power doctrine lacks independent force, as the
Court’s rulings on discrimination cases in the immigration context were consistent with
domestic decisions); Motomura, supra, at 549 (suggesting a reassessment of the plenary power
as a constitutional doctrine as a way out of courts’ improper reliance on “phantom
constitutional norms”); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J., 339, 353 (2002) (arguing that decreased risks of foreign affairs and the changed nature
of international decision-making undermine the reliance on the plenary power doctrine).
27. See, e.g., Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty, supra note 26, at
124.
28. See infra Part III.B.
29. See James A.R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law,
77 AM. J. INT’L L. 804, 817 (1983).
30. See supra note 26.
31. See infra Part III.B; see also Scaperlanda, supra note 26, at 1015 (“[W]here the inter-
national law of sovereignty provides the background norm for constitutional decisionmaking
as it does in alienage cases, the Court ought to look at the current norm with its recent
limitations.”).
32. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
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race was accepted both domestically and internationally, that is no
longer true. Reconsidering the plenary power doctrine under
international law reveals that the doctrine today prohibits race
discrimination in admissions.33
To accomplish the endeavor set out, Part I discusses the nine-
teenth-century understanding of the right to exclude prior to Chae
Chan Ping, the Chae Chan Ping Court’s grounding of the right to
exclude in state sovereignty, and the subsequent erosion of state
sovereignty in the twentieth century. Part II argues that customary
international law today prohibits racial discrimination in exclu-
sions. Specifically, this Part argues that, assuming the plaintiff suc-
ceeds in bringing a prima facie claim against the state for race dis-
crimination under an international law norm, the state would fail
in justifying its departure from that norm. This Part also examines
the possibility of whether the Court could find racial discrimination
in admissions as constituting “degrading treatment.” Part III
explains why Part II matters. In particular, this Part explains why
the Chae Chan Ping Court got it right when it relied on interna-
tional law to define the boundaries of a state’s exclusionary power,
and how the Court can take advantage of Chae Chan Ping to further
human rights by holding racial discrimination unlawful in exclusion
cases.
I. CHAE CHAN PING AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Chae Chan Ping created a shift in the international order. Prior
to this case, free movement and the humanitarian recognition of
individuals dominated the international order; the state’s power to
exclude stood as an exception.34 The Chae Chan Ping Court flipped
the rule and the exception, granting the United States an absolute
right to exclude based on the notion of state sovereignty.35 This Part
proceeds by discussing the liberal notions of free movement prior to
33. See infra Parts II-III. This Note relies exclusively on racial, and not religious,
discrimination because it has been more prevalent. And, while the structural argument in this
Note is applicable to religion-based exclusions, this Note is ultimately not concerned with its
cross-application to religion and thus renders those considerations outside of its scope.
34. See infra Part I.A.
35. See infra Part I.B.
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Chae Chan Ping, how the Court diverged from that understanding,
and how that shift never took hold in its absolute terms.
A. Pre-Chae Chan Ping Era
Unlike in the post-Chae Chan Ping era, a sovereign state’s
absolute right to exclude was not commonly recognized until the late
nineteenth century.36 The Bible, which influenced the development
of international law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
favored free movement across borders.37 The early Greeks and
Romans were fairly liberal in admitting aliens.38 For Marcus Tullius
Cicero, “To debar foreigners from enjoying the advantages of the city
[was] altogether contrary to the laws of humanity.”39
The emergence of the Westphalian system of nation-states
created stricter territorial boundaries, but the states continued to
endorse the prevailing free-movement policy. In 1852, the Foreign
Secretary of the United Kingdom stated that “by the existing law of
Great Britain all foreigners have the unrestricted right of entrance
into and residence in this country.”40 The United Kingdom did not
exclude or expel aliens from the end of the Napoleonic Wars until
36. Nafziger, supra note 29, at 809. Patrick J. Charles criticizes James Nafziger’s conclu-
sion by claiming that Nafziger “distorts the historical record and ... interprets the Magna
Carta too liberally,” which was subject to “lawful customs.” Patrick J. Charles, The Plenary
Power Doctrine and the Constitutionality of Ideological Exclusions: An Historical Perspective,
15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 61, 68 (2010). However, Nafziger does not argue that a sovereign’s
right to exclude did not exist until the nineteenth century, but rather that it was not absolute,
meaning that bars to entry were never absolute but subject to preconditions. See generally
Nafziger, supra note 29.
37. Nafziger, supra note 29, at 809 & n.20.
38. Id. at 809-10.
39. Id. at 810 n.25 (first alteration in original) (quoting M. CICERO, DE OFFICILS, bk.III,
ch. xi, at 47 (Loeb Classical Library ed. 1923)).
40. JOHN TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF THE PASSPORT: SURVEILLANCE, CITIZENSHIP AND
THE STATE 91 (2000) (quoting RICHARD PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 67 (2d rev.
ed. 1988)).
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1905.41 States’ constitutions42 and unilateral declarations43 also pro-
vided for such a right of entry.
Even more noteworthy were the liberal regulations adopted by
the Institute of International Law in 1892 regarding aliens’ limited
right of entry.44 The regulations provide that a state’s right to admit
aliens is “‘a logical and necessary consequence’ of its sovereignty and
independence” limited by “humanity and justice.”45 The provisions
thereafter articulate a rule of entry based on the aliens’ right to
enter, and not on a state’s right to exclude. Article 6 provides a
general rule: “Free entrance of aliens to the territory of a civilized
State, may not be generally and permanently forbidden except in
the public interest and for very serious reasons.”46 Article 12 then
provides some exceptions to an alien’s right of entry, such as when
he is a vagabond, beggar, criminal, or contagiously ill.47 Interest-
ingly, the drafters decided against adopting a proposed amendment
that would have permitted states to exclude based on “race, cus-
toms, or civilization.”48
41. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BE-
TWEEN STATES 97 (1978).
42. See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE 1876, art. 2 (“Los extranjeros podrán esta-
blecerse libremente en territorio español, ejercer en él su industria ó dedicarse á cualquiera
profesion.” [Foreigners can establish themselves freely in their industry or engage in any pro-
fession.]).
43. See, e.g., Déclaration Unilatérale du Gouvernement du Roi de la Haute-Birmanie
Indépendente, a la Date du 24 Mai 1884, Officiellement Remise a M. Jules Ferry, Ministre
des Affaires Éstrangéres, le 4 Août 1884, par Ambassade Birmane a Paris [1873 Treaty of
Friendship, Fr.-Burma], in 2 RECUEIL DES TRAITES CONCLUS PAR LA FRANCE EN EXTREME-
ORIENT: 1684-1902, 194-95 (Ernest Leroux ed. 1902) (“Le Gouvernement Franscais permettra
l’importation en Birmanie des marchandises et matériel nécessaires a la prospéritè, au
progrès et á l’indépendance de la Birmanie.” [The French Government shall permit the
importation into Burma of the goods and materials necessary for the prosperity, progress and
independence of Burma.]).
44. The Institute of International Law was created in 1873 as an independent institution
to contribute to international law with the aim that it be so implemented. Origins, INSTITUT
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, http://justitiaetpace.org/historique.php [https://perma.cc/F2CQ-
2XWM].
45. Nafziger, supra note 29, at 832 (footnotes omitted) (quoting INST. OF INT’L LAW,
RESOLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF INT’L LAW: DEALING WITH THE LAW OF NATIONS 104 (James
Brown Scott ed. & trans., 1916)).
46. Id. (quoting INST. OF INT’L LAW, supra note 45, at 105).
47. Id. at 833 (quoting INST. OF INT’L LAW, supra note 45, at 105).
48. Id. (quoting INST. OF INT’L LAW, supra note 45, at 104).
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In addition to the international order formally recognized by
states, the international law publicists of that time, on whose work
the Supreme Court later indirectly relied, also denied states an
unqualified right to exclude aliens.49 Hugo Grotius, a prominent
early commentator on immigration law, wrote that refugees may not
be denied permanent residence provided that they “submit them-
selves to the established government and observe any regulations
[which are] necessary in order to avoid strifes.”50 In discussing the
Spaniards’ right to travel to the New World, Francisco de Vitoria
confirmed they may do so “provided they do no harm to the natives”
and claimed that denying admission might constitute an act of
war.51 Christian Wolff, relying on Grotius and Vitoria, similarly
argued for free movement, subject to certain state-imposed excep-
tions.52 Emerich de Vattel adopted and refined earlier commenta-
tors’ principles in his influential book, Le Droit de Gens,53 on which
the Supreme Court explicitly relied in deciding the progeny cases of
Chae Chan Ping.54
Vattel combined natural and positive law in his international law
theory and distinguished between internal and external law.55
Internal law is rooted in natural law, establishing sovereign duties
in “conscience and principle.”56 External law—or positive law, as it
is commonly known—is composed of voluntary, conventional, and
customary elements57 and “establishes sovereign rights as a matter
of will.”58 Vattel, claimed to have adopted an absolutist view on the
states’ right to exclude,59 nonetheless qualified that right.60 Based
on the primitive state of communion and the right of necessity,
49. Id. at 810.
50. Id. at 811 (quoting HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AL PACIS 202 (Francis W. Kelsey
ed., 1925)).
51. Id. at 811 (quoting FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, DE INDIS DE JURE BELLI 151 (Ernest Nys
ed., 1917)).
52. Id. at 812-13.
53. Id. at 811-12.
54. Scaperlanda, supra note 26, at 1009.
55. Nafziger, supra note 29, at 812.
56. Id.
57. ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., GREAT JURISTS OF THE WORLD 495 (John MacDonnell &
Edward Manson eds., 1968).
58. Nafziger, supra note 29, at 812.
59. Scaperlanda, supra note 26, at 1009.
60. Nafziger, supra note 29, at 813.
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Vattel provided exceptions to the right to exclude, such as “the right
of procuring provisions by force, ... the right of passage,” and the
right of exiles or fugitives to reside permanently.61 For Vattel, “Con-
cepts of ‘conscience,’ [and] ‘duties of humanity,’ [were] vital.”62
Vattel’s theories proved to be crucial to the twentieth century
understanding of a sovereign nation’s power to exclude. The deci-
sions of the highest Anglo-American courts, which relied on Vattel
to uphold exclusions of specific alien groups in the late nineteenth
century, “have been cited as authority throughout the world.”63 The
following Section discusses those cases from the U.S. Supreme
Court: Chae Chan Ping v. United States64 and its progeny.
B. The Birth of the Plenary Power Doctrine: Chae Chan Ping v.
United States
Chae Chan Ping was a Chinese laborer who came to the United
States in 1875 during a period of unrestricted Chinese immigra-
tion.65 At that time, the United States sought to promote an influx
of cheap Chinese labor.66 The Burlingame Treaty of 1868, which
authorized unrestricted immigration from China, viewed Chinese
laborers as subjects of a “most favored nation.”67 Soon after Chae
Chan Ping’s arrival, nativist anti-Chinese sentiment grew wide-
spread in California and later, throughout the whole nation.68 In
1878, the California Constitutional Convention expressed to Con-
gress the State’s concern about the “Oriental invasion,” which was
considered “a menace to our civilization.”69
In 1880, the United States and China negotiated a supplemental
treaty limiting the immigration of Chinese laborers.70 Two years
later, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act which suspended
61. Id.
62. SATVINDER SINGH JUSS, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 14 (2006).
63. Nafziger, supra note 29, at 823.
64. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
65. Motomura, supra note 26, at 550.
66. Id.
67. Lindsay, supra note 12, at 40.
68. Motomura, supra note 26, at 550.
69. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595.
70. Motomura, supra note 26, at 550.
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the laborers’ immigration for ten years.71 Those Chinese who had
come before November 1880 but wished to leave the United States
and return at will could obtain a certificate proving their prior
entry.72 In 1884, those certificates became mandatory.73 Chae Chan
Ping obtained a certificate and left for China in 1887.74 Congress,
however, amended the Chinese Exclusion Act on October 1, 1888,
categorically prohibiting any Chinese laborer from returning.75 Chae
Chan Ping arrived in San Francisco eight days later, presented his
certificate, but was denied entry.76 In a petition of habeas corpus
before the Court, Chae Chan Ping challenged Congress’s authority
to pass the 1888 amendment, arguing that denial of entry violated
the treaty of 1868.77 The Court responded that, because both trea-
ties and acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land, the one
enacted later prevails.78 Justice Stephen Johnson Field, writing for
the majority, then considered Congress’s immigration power and
rooted it in international law.
The Constitution does not explicitly address the federal govern-
ment’s power to exclude.79 Before Chae Chan Ping, the source of con-
gressional authority to regulate immigration was the Commerce
Clause.80 Justice Field’s opinion confirmed that the federal govern-
ment has the power to regulate immigration but grounded it in the
concepts of state sovereignty and self-preservation.81 Justice Field
wrote:
To preserve its independence, and give security against
foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of
every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other consider-
ations are to be subordinated. It matters not in what form such
aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign
71. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58, 61 (1882) (repealed 1943).
72. Motomura, supra note 26, at 550-51.
73. Id. at 551.
74. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.
75. Lindsay, supra note 12, at 40-41.
76. Id. at 41.
77. Motomura, supra note 26, at 551.
78. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 600.
79. Motomura, supra note 26, at 551-52.
80. Lindsay, supra note 12, at 40.
81. Motomura, supra note 26, at 551-52.
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nation acting in its national character or from vast hordes of its
people crowding in upon us.82
The Court then infamously stated that the political branches could
exercise their power to regulate immigration without judicial
review, rendering that power plenary: “[If the government] consid-
ers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who
will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security
... its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.”83
In claiming that Congress’s determinations on the nation’s
security were “conclusive upon the judiciary,” the Court suggested
that the political branches had in essence an absolute power to
exclude. To obtain deference, the government need only claim that
barring a group of people was in the interest of national security.
While the doctrine of deference has continued, and the justifications
for nonjustificability remain, it is no longer the case under custom-
ary international law that race could be considered a factor for
admission purposes, even if under the guise of “national security.”84 
The Court expanded Congress’s plenary power in immigration
matters in two subsequent cases. In Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, the Court upheld a provision of the Immigration Act of
189185 that made an immigrant who was likely to become a public
charge excludable.86 The Court cited Vattel in creating an oft-quoted
proposition for the future, while ignoring the exceptions Vattel
afforded to his claim:
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners
within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and
upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.87
82. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
83. Id.
84. See infra Part II.
85. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891).
86. 142 U.S. 651, 664 (1892).
87. Id. at 659.
2632 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2617
In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Court extended the plenary
power doctrine to expulsion.88
The Court thus made it clear by the late nineteenth century that
it would not engage in any judicial review and second-guess the
immigration policies set by the political branches.89 The Chinese
Exclusion Act, coupled with the Supreme Court’s nod to considering
a whole race as a threat to white America, also had a domino effect
on other countries.90 Yet, despite the Court’s efforts to articulate an
absolutist view of state sovereignty, states began to cede their
sovereignty in the twentieth century.
C. Erosion of State Sovereignty: The Individual International
Rights Revolution
The turn of the twentieth century saw free movement and entry
into a state as an exception, rather than the prior-existing norm, in
international relations.91 But this new absolutist view of a sover-
eign’s powers never took root.92 Instead, the recognition of the
individual as a subject of international law after World War II led
to the adoption of binding international covenants on human rights
that began to erode state sovereignty.93 This Section briefly exam-
ines this movement.
The atrocities of World War II significantly shifted the inter-
national order. One of the effects of the Nuremberg trials was that
the individual, and not just the state, became a subject of interna-
tional law.94 The United Nations Charter, adopted in 1945, called
upon its members to “promote ... universal respect for, and obser-
vance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”95 The United Na-
tions established a Commission on Human Rights, which produced
an aspirational, nonbinding Universal Declaration of Human Rights
88. 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893).
89. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
90. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
91. See supra Parts I.A-B.
92. See generally Nafziger, supra note 29.
93. See Scaperlanda, supra note 26, at 1010.
94. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 839 (1997).
95. U.N. Charter arts. 55(c), 56.
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“as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all na-
tions.”96 A binding covenant on human rights, the International Bill
of Rights, followed, along with the western-minded International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the socialist-leaning
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.97
Despite the socio-political conflict between the western and socialist
camps, both documents’ preambles state that the “foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world” is “recognition of the inher-
ent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members
of the human family.”98 Already by 1990, the international commu-
nity had developed twenty-two binding international human rights
documents,99 focusing on genocide, apartheid, racial discrimination,
the rights of women, and the status of refugees.100
The establishment of a legal regime outside of the states suggests
a return to the ideas of early international law scholars by trans-
forming natural rights and obligations into positive, or external
law.101 Through the adoption of international treaties, the “individ-
ual international rights revolution” fueled the recognition of these
rights under customary international law. The following Part
discusses customary international law, explains its relevance, and
applies it to a hypothetical racial discrimination in the admissions
context.
II. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW’S PROHIBITION ON RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN ADMISSION LAWS
Part I discussed the significant decline of state sovereignty over
the twentieth century. Due to this decline, international law came
to recognize domestic racial discrimination as unlawful.102 This Part
argues that international law should now recognize cross-border
96. Scaperlanda, supra note 26, at 1010-11 (quoting G.A. Res. 217A (1948)).
97. Id. at 1012.
98. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at pmbl.
(Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; G.A. Res. 2200, International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, at pmbl. (Dec. 16, 1966).
99. Scaperlanda, supra note 26, at 1012.
100. Id. at 1013.
101. Id. at 1011.
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
(AM. LAW INST. 1987).
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racial discrimination as unlawful as well. Specifically, this Part ar-
gues that customary international law prohibits racial discrimina-
tion in admissions, which the U.S. Supreme Court can recognize. As
later discussed, Chae Chan Ping permits—or even demands—an
international law analysis because the Supreme Court grounded the
United States’s exclusionary power in state sovereignty, a concept
that is dependent on international order.
This Part proceeds by first discussing the importance of custom-
ary international law and its current nonderogable norms. It then
lays out the framework for analyzing a racially discriminatory ad-
mission law under customary international law and makes a first
attempt at analyzing a hypothetical racial exclusion. Finally, this
Part discusses the potential of the U.S. Supreme Court to find that
racial exclusion constitutes “degrading treatment,” which is a vio-
lation of a separate human right under customary international
law.103
A. Jus Cogens and Its Legal Framework
“Customary international law, a source of positive international
law, is distinct from conventional law.”104 Every nation is bound by
custom unless it specifically dissents during the development of the
custom.105 As immigration law scholar Michael Scaperlanda points
out, recognition of customary international law as a distinct source
of international law is important because “custom binds non-con-
tracting states,” makes the norms reflected in treaties binding even
for those states in which treaties are not self-executing, and may
abrogate reservations to treaties that states have made.106
In international law, “jus cogens” norms function as “very strong
rule[s] of customary international law”107 or even as “international
103. Id.
104. Scaperlanda, supra note 26, at 1014.
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) cmt. b.
106. Scaperlanda, supra note 26, at 1014.
107. Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights,
12 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 417 (1989) (alteration in original) (quoting ANTHONY
A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 132 n.73 (1971)).
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constitutional law.”108 Jus cogens refers to norms that are peremp-
tory—that is, they supersede conflicting treaties and custom, are
mandatory and nonderogable, and “can be modified only by general
international norms of equivalent authority.”109 International
human rights limiting states’ sovereignty have acquired the status
of jus cogens.110 The seven human rights that have achieved jus
cogens status are: prohibitions on “genocide[;] ... slavery[;] ... murder
or causing the disappearance of individuals[;] ... torture or other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment[;] ...
prolonged arbitrary detention[;] systematic racial discrimination[;]
or ... a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights.”111
Analyzing violations of jus cogens is fairly straightforward in
racial discrimination cases. First, the plaintiff has to make out a
prima facie claim of direct or indirect discrimination.112 If the plain-
tiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the state to justify its disparate
treatment.113 Because no court has applied the jus cogens prohibi-
tion on racial discrimination in admissions, the following analysis
assumes that a plaintiff has made a prima facie case.114 It then
considers the state’s two strongest justifications for treating admis-
sions differently: (1) courts have never applied the jus cogens norm
in admissions; and that (2) international treaties prohibiting racial
discrimination exempt racial discrimination in the context of
admissions.
108. Id. at 417 n.28 (quoting Mark W. Janis, The Nature of Jus Cogens, 3 CONN. J. INT’L
359, 363 (1988)).
109. Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Duty of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE  J. INT’L
L. 331, 331-32 (2009).
110. See Scaperlanda, supra note 26, at 1014.
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
(AM. LAW INST. 1987).
112. Emily M. Borich, “Anti-Haitianismo”: From Violence to a Travesty of Justice in the
Dominican Republic, 28 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 61, 65 (2015).
113. Id.
114. The analysis also assumes the legality of discrimination based on nationality alone.
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B. The Hypothetical Racial Exclusion: Scrutinizing the State’s
Justifications
The state would likely argue that, although jus cogens generally
prohibits racial discrimination, states’ admission of aliens stands as
an exception. This broader argument splits into two. First, the state
would claim that no court has applied the jus cogens norm in admis-
sions. Second, the state would claim that international treaties that
prohibit racial discrimination exempt states’ immigration measures.
1. Justification #1: Jus Cogens Against Discrimination Has
Never Been Applied in Admissions
The state’s first argument, that no court has applied the jus
cogens norm against racial discrimination in admissions, does not
presumptively favor the state. The argument cuts both ways be-
cause the absence of action can explain either the exclusion’s legiti-
macy or the lack thereof. Assuming this argument does favor the
state, however, this Note has attempted, but failed to unearth any
court decision either expressly applying or refusing to apply the anti-
discrimination principle as jus cogens in a state’s race-based or ra-
cially discriminatory exclusion. However, two courts—the European
Commission and the New Zealand Supreme Court—have at least
domestically rejected the antidiscrimination norm as exempting
admissions from its application. These decisions have international-
law implications. When finding customary international law, U.S.
courts rely on various sources, such as “the works of jurists, writing
professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of
nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that
law.”115 
115. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820)). In the Court’s foundational
case for the sources of customary international law, The Paquete Habana, the Court stated:
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who
by years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the
law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
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In East African Asians v. United Kingdom, thirty-one citizens of
the United Kingdom sought entry into Britain in 1970.116 The Uni-
ted Kingdom authorities refused admission to some of them under
the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968 (Act),117 which imposed
immigration controls on United Kingdom passport-holders in the
United Kingdom’s former colonies of Kenya and Uganda, but no
other United Kingdom citizens.118
The European Commission on Human Rights119 (Commission)
found multiple violations of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).120
The Commission found that the Act discriminated based on race
and, as applied in “special circumstances,”121 constituted “degrading
treatment” within the meaning of the ECHR.122 This case involved
the exclusion of citizens, but to find “degrading treatment,” the
Commission derived the rights of citizens from the rights of ali-
ens.123 The Commission inferred from its case law regarding aliens’
right to asylum and the right not to be expelled—a violation of
which may constitute “inhuman treatment”—that the contracting
parties to the ECHR “agreed to restrict the free exercise of their
powers under general international law, including the power to
control the entry and exit of aliens, to the extent and within the
limits of the obligations which they assumed under th[e] treaty.”124
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (citing Hylton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64, 214-15 (1895)).
116. East African Asians v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4403/70, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5, 7
(1973).
117. Id.
118. See id. at 58.
119. The commission is now known as the European Court of Human Rights. See European
Court of Human Rights, INT’L JUST. RESOURCE CTR., http://www.ijrcenter.org/european-court-
of-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/84SF-UHJF].
120. East African Asians, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 58, 62; see Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [herein-
after ECHR].
121. The special circumstances were that (1) the applicants had previously received a
“pledge” of free entry; (2) they, as United Kingdom citizens, had nowhere else to seek
admission than to the United Kingdom because their East African residence became illegal;
and (3) as citizens and not aliens, the discriminatory immigration control rendered them
second-class citizens by denying them the same right of entry. East African Asians, 31 Eur.
H.R. Rep. at 57-58, 60-61.
122. Id. at 54-62.
123. Id. at 54.
124. Id. (emphasis added).
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Extending such considerations to citizens, the Commission con-
cluded that although the right to entry was not protected, a refusal
of entry may “in certain special circumstances ... violate ... inde-
pendently another [protected] right”—the right not to be subjected
to “degrading treatment.”125
The Commission’s finding of “degrading treatment” is further
discussed in Part II.C. For present purposes, however, it is impor-
tant to highlight the Commission’s reasoning. Even though this case
involved a state’s violation of a treaty, the Commission claimed that
when signing this treaty, the contracting parties agreed to restrict
their power to control the entry of aliens under “general interna-
tional law.”126 In other words, when finding that the UK citizens’
exclusion amounted to “degrading treatment,” the Commission pre-
supposed that the ECHR must demand such an interpretation
because international law would demand it.127 The Commission’s
ultimate finding of a violation within the ECHR is therefore not as
significant. Although the Commission focused on a finding of “de-
grading treatment,” its reasoning extended to an analysis of the pro-
hibition against racial discrimination under international law.128
Here, the Commission had no reason to go that far because its find-
ing of racial discrimination fell under the ECHR’s application.129
Although racial exclusions were once politically accepted, judicial
opinions on such exclusions are rare because states began to repeal
their discriminatory admission laws in the mid-twentieth century.130
This trend makes East African Asians exceptional. The case out of
New Zealand did not involve a discriminatory exclusion by the
State, but the New Zealand Supreme Court still showed hostility
toward a state’s absolute power to exclude.131 In 1978, the New Zea-
land Supreme Court rejected the State’s view that common law
countries possessed an absolute right to exclude aliens, calling it
“xenophobic” and stating that “the Royal prerogative to keep foreig-
ners at bay has been superseded by the modern transportation and
125. Id. at 54-55.
126. Id. at 54.
127. See id. at 54-55.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 58-59, 62.
130. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
131. See Chandra v. Minister of Immigration [1978] NZSC, [1978] 2 NZLR 559 at [568]
(N.Z.).
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the mass population movements of the 20th century.”132 Although
the court did not reference international law, it based its conclusion
on the drastically different international order.133 Further, its short,
yet swift, dismissal of the suggestion that a state has the absolute
power to exclude134 reasonably implies that the court would have
rejected the State’s argument for a racial exclusion as well. 
Although no court has expressly applied the jus cogens norm in
race-based exclusions, these two rulings suggest that they could
have. The European Commission essentially presupposed such a
finding, and the New Zealand Supreme Court’s finding a state’s
absolute exclusionary power as “xenophobic” hardly leaves room to
characterize a racial exclusion as anything different. Assuming the
lack of cases applying jus cogens in racial exclusions favors the
state’s position, these courts’ opinions overcome any such presump-
tion.
2. Justification #2: Applicable Treaties Prohibiting
Discrimination Exempt Admissions
The state’s second, and stronger, justification would rely on the
widely known treaties prohibiting racial discrimination that seem-
ingly exempt admissions from their application. The state may fur-
ther argue that these exemptions are evidence of exceptions in the
jus cogens prohibition. This Subsection discusses these treaties and
their shortcomings. As with judicial opinions, the U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized international conventions and treaties as
sources of customary international law.135
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734-35 (2004); see also Doe I v. Nestle
USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2014) (claiming that international conventions are
sources of international law). The fact that neither of these treaties is self-executing is insig-
nificant because customary international law can make norms reflected in treaties binding
even for those states in which treaties are not self-executing. See Scaperlanda, supra note 26,
at 1014.
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a. The International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination
International law scholar Gabriel J. Chin has argued that inter-
national covenants addressing racial discrimination suggest that
international law does not authorize states to regulate immigration
on the basis of race.136 Chin claims that the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) is “the broadest expression of the antidiscrimination prin-
ciple in international law.”137 Signatories to this convention, includ-
ing the United States, commit “to engage in no act or practice of
racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or in-
stitutions”138 and “to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination
in all its forms.”139
Other scholars respond that a closer reading of this instrument
reveals limitations in the immigration context.140 Article 1(3) of
the CERD provides that the convention does not “in any way” affect
the laws states may pass regarding “nationality, citizenship, or
naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate
against any particular nationality.”141 Article 1(2) of the CERD pro-
vides that the convention does not apply to state discrimination
“between citizens and non-citizens.”142 Article 1(1) defines racial
136. Chin, supra note 26, at 62.
137. Id. at 60.
138. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
art. 2(1)(a), opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD]. The
United States ratified the convention in 1994. CERD, U.S. HUM. RTS. NETWORK, http://www.
ushrnetwork.org/our-work/issues/cerd [https://perma.cc/J267-KZSX].
139. CERD, supra note 138, art. 5. The convention defines “racial discrimination” as
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour,
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying
or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural or any other field of public life.
Id. art. 1(1).
140. Kif Augustine-Adams, The Plenary Power Doctrine After September 11, 38 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 701, 730 (2005); Liav Orgad & Theodore Ruthizer, Race, Religion and Nationality in
Immigration Selection: 120 Years After the Chinese Exclusion Case, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 237,
268-70 (2010).
141. Augustine-Adams, supra note 140, at 730-31 (quoting CERD, supra note 138, art.
1(3)).
142. CERD, supra note 138, art. 1(2).
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discrimination only with respect to “human rights and fundamental
freedoms,” and it is questionable whether entry to a state is either
of those.143
The CERD therefore seems to exempt immigration matters from
its application, including admission criteria. Moreover, the conven-
tion protects only citizens by exempting a state’s “distinctions,
exclusions, restrictions or preferences ... between citizens and non-
citizens.”144 However, the apparent exemptions in the CERD
fundamentally conflict with another, equally authoritative treaty.
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Geneva
Convention on Refugees) extends the prohibition against racial dis-
crimination to a class of noncitizens by requiring signatories to
afford benefits to refugees “without discrimination as to race, reli-
gion or country of origin.”145 Therefore, a noncitizen alien petitioning
for entry into a state as a refugee enjoys the determination of that
right free from racial discrimination. By extension, a noncitizen,
nonrefugee alien should also enjoy a determination of entry free
from racial discrimination because it seems unreasonable to claim
that an individual’s right not to be racially discriminated against is
somehow stronger once he has a fear of persecution in his country
of nationality.146 An individual’s right not to be racially discrimi-
nated against is not enhanced just because that same right is not
recognized, but violated, in his native country.
Admittedly, this argument assumes that a state will admit refu-
gees while excluding other aliens. But a state has no inherent duty
to admit refugees.147 A key customary international law norm
recognizes only the prohibition of removing an individual to a coun-
try where he risks facing persecution—the principle of non-refoule-
ment.148 However, to respect that principle in practice means to
143. Orgad & Ruthizer, supra note 140, at 269 (quoting CERD, supra note 138, art. 1(1)).
144. CERD, supra note 138, art. 1(2).
145. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 3, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
[hereinafter Geneva Convention on Refugees]; see also Chin, supra note 26, at 61.
146. A refugee is an individual who is outside of his country of nationality and “is unable”
or “unwilling to return to it” due to a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”
Geneva Convention on Refugees, supra note 145, art. 1(A)(2).
147. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 301
(2005).
148. Aoife Duffy, Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-Refoulement in International Law, 20
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 373, 389 (2008) (arguing that the principle of non-refoulement is firmly
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admit an individual to determine whether a risk of persecution
exists, even if the state later decides to send him to a country where
no such risk exists.149 The principle of non-refoulement thus recog-
nizes a limited duty to admit refugees.150 If a state has a limited
duty to admit refugees, whose admission it must consider without
discrimination on racial grounds, the state must similarly consider
a nonrefugee’s admission. If the state could racially discriminate
against nonrefugees, but not against refugees, then an alien’s right
not to be discriminated against would depend on the actions of her
native country—persecution or the individual’s legitimate fear
thereof—and not on the alien herself. This is an unreasonable
premise. Thus, if refugees as a class of noncitizens are protected
from racial discrimination in the determination of their admissions,
then so are other noncitizens.
To justify race discrimination in admissions, the state’s reliance
on this treaty is therefore undermined because both refugees and
nonrefugees have a right not to be racially discriminated against
based on the refugees’ limited de facto right of entry. However, the
state would plead its reliance on another treaty, to which this Note
now turns.
b. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Like the CERD, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), appears to prohibit any kind of racial discrimina-
tion. Article 26 of the ICCPR, to which the United States is a party,
provides:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this
respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimina-
tion on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
established in customary international law). But see HATHAWAY, supra note 147, at 364
(claiming that “refoulement still remains part of the reality for significant numbers of
refugees, in most parts of the world”).
149. See HATHAWAY, supra note 147, at 301.
150. See id.
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political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.151
However, other articles of the ICCPR seem to exempt immigration
and citizenship matters from its application.152 Article 2 provides
that a state signatory commits “to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of
any kind, such as race.”153 The covenant also outlines some specific
migration rights. Article 12 provides the right to move and choose
a residence within a state territory, the right to leave any territo-
ry, and the right to return to one’s own country,154 but no other.
Thus, the ICCPR is limited to states’ territory and domestic ju-
risdiction, treating territorial boundaries as sacred.
But the United Nations switched course in 1985 when the Unit-
ed Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Hu-
man Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in
Which They Live (Declaration on Aliens’ Rights).155 This instrument
further guarantees the human rights of aliens.156 Notably, unlike
the prior international covenants, this declaration is less deferential
to states’ authority concerning immigration. Article 2 provides:
Nothing in this Declaration shall be interpreted as legitimizing
the illegal entry into and presence in a State of any alien, nor
shall any provision be interpreted as restricting the right of any
State to promulgate laws and regulations concerning the entry
of aliens and the terms and conditions of their stay or to
establish differences between nationals and aliens. However,
such laws and regulations shall not be incompatible with the
151. ICCPR, supra note 98, art. 26; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/BLA9-36U2] (listing the Unit-
ed States as a party to the ICCPR).
152. Augustine-Adams, supra note 140, at 731-33.
153. ICCPR, supra note 98, art. 2 (emphasis added); see also Orgad & Ruthizer, supra note
140, at 269.
154. ICCPR, supra note 98, art. 12(1)-(3). The term “own country” is likely interpreted as
one of which an individual has citizenship.
155. G.A. Res. 40/144, Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not
Nationals of the Country in Which They Live (Dec. 13, 1985) [hereinafter Declaration on
Aliens’ Rights].
156. See id.
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international legal obligations of that State, including those in
the field of human rights.157
The meaning of the term “international legal obligations ... includ-
ing those in the field of human rights”158 has not been defined by the
courts. However, the background of this declaration suggests that
the term, at the very least, implies a general prohibition against
racial discrimination. The United Nations adopted the declaration
in response to Uganda’s mass expulsion of Asians in 1972 when
the Ugandan president, in response to Asians’ “sabotag[ing] the
economy,” ordered around fifty thousand alien Asians to leave the
country in ninety days.159 Because that case involved an expulsion,
the United Nations need not have included provisions regarding
the entry of aliens. But, as it did, the United Nations must have
concluded that the jus cogens antidiscrimination principle applies
to both entry and exit.
Article 2 of the Declaration on Aliens’ Rights appears to directly
conflict with the CERD, which exempts distinctions between citizens
and noncitizens from its application.160 This declaration also con-
flicts with the ICCPR, which commits states to recognize rights only
within their domestic jurisdiction.161 However, as not legally bind-
ing,162 the declaration does not supersede the CERD or the ICCPR.
But along with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, which arguably
recognizes refugees’ limited de facto entry based on customary in-
ternational law, the Declaration on Aliens’ Rights suggests a shift
away from the rigid exemptions in the CERD. They are further ev-
idence of the continuing “individual rights revolution.”163
The state could nonetheless claim that precisely because the
Declaration on Aliens’ Rights and the Geneva Convention on
157. Id. art. 2 (emphasis added).
158. Id.
159. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 20, 22, 26 (1995).
160. Compare Declaration on Aliens’ Rights, supra note 155, art. 2, with CERD, supra note
138, art. 1(2).
161. Compare Declaration on Aliens’ Rights, supra note 155, art. 2, with ICCPR, supra note
98, art. 2.
162. See Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Rights of Migrant Workers One Year on: Transforma-
tion or Consolidation?, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 113, 134-35 (2004).
163. Cf. Scaperlanda, supra note 26, at 1009-11.
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Refugees have no formal effect on the CERD and ICCPR, they are
irrelevant, and the customary effect in the exception remains. But
despite states’ adoption of the CERD and ICCPR in the 1960s,164
their immigration practices suggest they did not think the antidis-
crimination principle exempted admissions from its application.165
c. State Practices Undermine CERD and ICCPR
Asian immigration into the Americas, Australia, and Canada led
to the passage of racially discriminatory exclusion laws.166 Dem-
ocratic polities headed this movement, and undemocratic govern-
ments in South America followed.167 The United States was the
first among the Western democracies to adopt a racially explicit
immigration law, first restricting and then banning the entry of
Chinese laborers.168 Other states quickly followed suit. The Cana-
dian legislature first implemented a head tax for every Chinese
immigrant in 1885,169 then banned “immigrants belonging to any
race deemed unsuitable to the climate or requirements of Can-
ada,”170 and finally banned, with certain exceptions, “any immigrant
of any Asiatic race” in 1923.171 Australia, on the other hand, did not
include racial or national-origin terms in its 1901 Immigration Re-
striction Act.172 But it nonetheless implemented a “White Australia”
policy173 by selectively enforcing its “dictation test.”174 Britain passed
164. See supra notes 98, 138.
165. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
166. See DAVID SCOTT FITZGERALD & DAVID COOK-MARTIN, CULLING THE MASSES: THE
DEMOCRATIC ORIGINS OF RACIST IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE AMERICAS 334 (2014); Nafziger,
supra note 29, at 816. New Zealand also experienced an increase in Asian immigration at that
time. Id. at 816. However, this Note omits New Zealand’s policy towards Asians, as it was
similar to Australia’s. See Robert A. Huttenback, No Strangers Within the Gates: Attitudes
and Policies Towards the Non-White Residents of the British Empire of Settlement, 1 J. IMPER-
IAL & COMMONWEALTH HIST. 271, 294 (1973).
167. FITZGERALD & COOK-MARTIN, supra note 166, at 11.
168. See supra Part I.B.
169. FITZGERALD & COOK-MARTIN, supra note 166, at 145 tbl.4.1.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, SELECTING BY ORIGIN: ETHNIC MIGRATION IN THE LIBERAL STATE
45 (2005).
173. See id. at 44-49.
174. The 1901 Immigration Restriction Act defines a “prohibited” immigrant as “[a]ny
person who when asked to do so by an officer fails to write out at dictation and sign in the
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its Aliens Act of 1905 in response to growing Jewish immigration,175
but the Act was racially neutral and prohibited “undesirable[s]” on
the basis of lack of support, or if the individual was a “lunatic[,]
idiot,” or diseased.176
South American countries, with the exception of Argentina, were
adamant in passing racially explicit immigration laws, focusing both
on positive and negative preferences.177 The states welcomed immi-
gration from Europe,178 but banned or restricted Asian, African,
Jewish, or Roma immigration.179 For example, in 1938 Bolivia de-
clared itself open to all aliens except Chinese, blacks, gitanos,180 and
Jews not “valuable to national activities.”181 A 1922 Colombian law
barred the entry of immigrants who, due to their ethnicity, would be
“inconvenient” for the country and the “better development of the
race.”182 In 1934, a Costa Rican law prohibited the migration and
employment of “people of color.”183 Guatemala excluded Chinese in
1896, the “Mongolian race” in 1909, Hindus and gitanos in 1927,
and blacks in 1936.184 Uruguay “absolutely prohibited” the entry of
Asians, Africans, Bohemians, and gitanos in 1890, and in 1902
presence of the officer a passage of fifty words in length in an European language directed by
the officer.” Id. at 45-46 (alteration in original). This was a “trick test,” as an individual
became “prohibited” only by failing the test, but the government would pick out those
individuals before administering the test. Id. at 46.
175. Helena Wray, The Aliens Act 1905 and the Immigration Dilemma, 33 J.L. & SOC’Y 302,
308 (2006).
176. Id. at 311.
177. For reasons why Argentina did not pass racially explicit immigration laws, see
FITZGERALD & COOK-MARTIN, supra note 166, at 300. Brazil’s first immigration law did not
make ethnic distinctions either, yet excluded blacks in practice. See id. at 274.
178. For example, a Peruvian law of 1891 provided that “foreigners of the white race”
would receive room and board upon arrival, tax exemptions, and other incentives. Id. at 374.
179. See id. at 274-332; see also Angela S. García, Ethnic Selection in Sixteen Countries, in
FITZGERALD & COOK-MARTIN, supra note 166, app. at 351-77.
180. “Gitano” means “gypsy” in English. Gitano, CAMBRIDGE SPANISH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/spanish-english/gitano?fallbackFrom=english-
spanish [https://perma.cc/X3DL-M8DK].
181. García, supra note 179, at 351, 354 (quoting Supreme Res. of Mar. 14, 1938, Selección
en el Ingreso de Judíos).
182. Id. at 357 (quoting L. 114 diciembre 30, 1922, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.)).
Colombia also banned the entry of laborers of African race in 1847, Chinese from 1887-92, and
gitanos regardless of nationality in 1935. Id. at 356-57.
183. Id. at 359 (quoting INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, ASPECTOS JURÍDICOSE INSTITUCIONALES
DE LAS MIGRACIONES: COSTA RICA 3 (1991)).
184. Id. at 364-65.
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prohibited “elements harmful to the mass of our population,”
including “all damaging influences such as inferior races.”185
As with the institution of racial bans, the United States was the
first to reverse the trend, repealing the Chinese Exclusion Act in
1943186 and granting races native to India the privilege to enter in
1946.187 Canada repealed its Chinese Immigration Act in 1947188 and
removed all hints of racial discrimination from immigration regula-
tions and procedures in 1967.189 The “White Australia” policy lasted
longer than the racially exclusive immigration policy of other colo-
nist states, but ultimately ended in 1973.190 The Australian Prime
Minister Gough Whitlam’s use of language in abandoning “White
Australia” is telling:
One of the crucial ways in which we must improve our global
reputation is to apply our aspirations for equality at home to our
relations with the peoples of the world as a whole .... [W]e have
an obligation to remove methodically from Australia’s laws and
practices all racially discriminatory provisions .... As an island
nation of predominantly European inhabitants situated on the
edge of Asia, we cannot afford the stigma of racialism.191
Britain, the previous head of the Commonwealth states of Australia
and Canada, continued to abstain from instituting a “colour bar” in
order to “maintain [its] great metropolitan tradition of hospitality
to everyone from every part of [its] Empire.”192
185. Id. at 377.
186. Act of December 17, 1943, Pub. L. No. 199, 57 Stat. 600. For a short discussion on the
bill’s development, see EDWARD P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY 1798-1965, at 264-65 (1981). In 2011, the Senate passed a resolution renouncing anti-
Chinese laws as “‘incompatible with the basic founding principles recognized in the Dec-
laration of Independence that all persons are created equal’ and ‘incompatible with the spirit
of the United States Constitution.’” FITZGERALD & COOK-MARTIN, supra note 166, at 337
(quoting S. Res. 201 (2011)).
187. RICHARD PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 65 (1972). However, de facto
discrimination continued due to the unfavorable quota system. Id.
188. See id.
189. Harold Troper, Canada’s Immigration Policy Since 1945, 68 INT’L J. 255, 270 (1993).
190. See JOPPKE, supra note 172, at 64-65.
191. Id. at 64 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Commonwealth, Parlia-
mentary Debates, House of Representatives, 24 May 1973, 2649 (Gough Whitlam, Foreign
Minister (Austl.))).
192. Id. at 97 (statement of Sir David Maxwell Fyfe) (quoting RANDALL HANSEN, CITIZEN-
SHIP AND IMMIGRATION IN POST-WAR BRITAIN 50 (2000)). On the other hand, the Common-
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South American countries acted likewise. In Argentina, the 1949
constitution prohibited race as a criterion for immigrant selection,
although it maintained a preference for Europeans.193 Brazil repeal-
ed its nationality quotas in 1980.194 Bolivia repealed its restrictions
of Jews and gitanos in 1996.195 Costa Rica prohibited all immigra-
tion restrictions based on race in 1973.196 Guatemala repealed its
various racial exclusions in 1986.197 In 2008, Panama became the
last country in the Americas to repeal racially explicit immigration
restrictions.198
Therefore, while states may have formally agreed to exempt the
admissions context from the antidiscrimination principle’s appli-
cation in the 1950s and 1960s,199 that agreement meant very little
in practice. States’ uniform abandonment and even prohibition of
race discrimination in admissions since the 1940s until the early
2000s suggests that the seeming exemptions in CERD and ICCPR
are antiquated. More importantly, contradiction with state prac-
tices implies these exemptions do not reflect current international
law. The Supreme Court has stated that claims of international law
norms “must be gauged against the current state of international
law.”200 Reliance on these treaties for a jus cogens exception is there-
fore unwarranted. 
The state’s two likely justifications for differential treatment in
admissions under international law would be severely undermined.
The state’s argument on the lack of cases applying jus cogens to
wealth Immigrants Act of 1971 created a “racial contrast” by subjecting many British
passport-holding Asians of West Africa to migration controls within the Commonwealth. Id.
at 97-98. (quoting Parl. Deb. HC (5th Ser.) (1971) col. 46). That policy ended in 1981. See id.
at 102-03.
193. FITZGERALD & COOK-MARTIN, supra note 166, at 322. The subsequent military regime
abrogated the Constitution of 1949, but the regime’s immigration law of 1981 only provided
for a positive preference of immigrants. See id. at 324, 327.
194. Id. at 289.
195. García, supra note 179, at 354.
196. Id. at 359.
197. See id. at 364-65.
198. Id. at 372.
199. See supra notes 95-98, 137-39 and accompanying text.
200. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 (2004); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[C]ourts must interpret international law not as it was ..., but
as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.” (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796))).
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race-based exclusions201 can presumptively weigh in favor of either
the plaintiff or the state. As an empirical matter, the recent rever-
sals of discriminatory admission laws may explain this absence:
courts had no reason to apply international law if changing domestic
law aligned with domestic antidiscrimination policies. Even if this
absence presumptively weighed in favor of the state, the opinions of
at least two courts have international law implications that over-
come this presumption.202 Finally, the exemptions in the applicable
international treaties prohibiting racial discrimination fundamen-
tally conflict with state practices and therefore do not reflect current
international law.203 If a plaintiff brought a prima facie case of race
discrimination in admission policy, the state would fail in shoulder-
ing its burden on these grounds.
C. International Law’s Prohibition Against Degrading Treatment
A racially discriminatory admissions measure may also constitute
degrading treatment under customary international law. If the
plaintiff succeeds in showing a jus cogens violation in admissions,
this means that international law can prohibit merely extraterrito-
rial effects. In other words, customary international law may give
aliens standing in the admissions context.204 Following such a find-
ing, a court could further consider whether a race-based exclusion
violates other jus cogens norms. This Section analyzes the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s potential to find a race-based exclusion as consti-
tuting “degrading treatment” of aliens. To explore this possibility,
this Section first discusses as an example the East African Asians
case that held racial exclusion to be “degrading treatment” based on
dignitary harms. Then, it examines whether the Court could do the
same.
201. See supra Part II.B.1.
202. See supra Part II.B.1.
203. See supra Part II.B.2.
204. Admittedly this kind of standing argument is significantly more persuasive in a
supranational court, like the ECHR, rather than in a state’s domestic court.
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1. East African Asians v. United Kingdom
As discussed in Part II, the European Commission found in East
African Asians that the United Kingdom subjected its citizens to
“degrading treatment” in violation of the ECHR when it restricted
admission to some of its citizens on racial grounds.205 Because the
U.S. Supreme Court has not defined the term “degrading treat-
ment,” the Commission’s decision is instructive in defining the term
under international law. The Court’s jurisprudence is certainly dif-
ferent from that of the Commission in all respects, but the Court,
like the Commission, can ground the term “degrading treatment”
in “dignity”—a term with which the Court is all too familiar206—
without appealing to the Commission’s decision.
In its decision, the Commission stated that although the right to
entry is not protected, a refusal of entry may “in certain special
circumstances ... violate quite independently another [protected]
right”—the right not to be subjected to “degrading treatment.”207 In
finding “degrading treatment,” the Commission denied that the
term was limited to physical acts.208 The Commission stated:
The term “degrading treatment” in this context indicates that
the general purpose of the provision is to prevent interferences
with the dignity of man of a particularly serious nature. It
follows that an action which lowers a person in rank, position,
reputation or character can only be regarded as “degrading
treatment” in the sense of Article 3 where it reaches a certain
level of severity.209
The Commission concluded that, as here, racial discrimination in
certain circumstances may by itself amount to degrading treatment,
and that to “publicly ... single out a group of persons for differential
205. See supra notes 116-25 and accompanying text.
206. See infra Part II.C.2.
207. East African Asians v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4403/70, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5, 54-55
(1973).
208. Id. at 55. The Commission stated the neither the term “torture” nor “inhuman treat-
ment” is limited to physical acts, either. Id.
209. Id. (emphasis added).
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treatment on the basis of race might ... constitute a special form of
affront to human dignity.”210
The Commission’s use of the term “dignity” in defining an inter-
national human right is nothing new. The concept of dignity as a
basis for equal human rights is internationally well-recognized.
Signatories to the United Nations Charter commit to “reaffirm faith
... in the dignity and worth of the human person.”211 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights states that “the inherent dignity” and
“equal and inalienable rights” of all are “the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace.”212 Various countries even protect a person’s dig-
nity in their constitutions.213 For example, Article I of the German
Constitution provides: “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To re-
spect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”214 In
addition to the ECHR, another supranational adjudicative body
has linked the idea of dignity to discrimination. In 2009, the United
Nations Human Rights Committee found Spain in violation of Arti-
cle 26 of the ICCPR for targeting certain individuals in identity
checks based on their race.215 The Committee stated that to target
only persons with specific physical or ethnic characteristics “would
not only negatively affect the dignity of the persons concerned, but
would also contribute to the spread of xenophobic attitudes in the
public at large and would run counter to an effective policy aimed
at combating racial discrimination.”216
Although the Commission found “degrading treatment” within
the meaning of the ECHR, a jus cogens norm recognized in the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
210. Id. at 62.
211. U.N. Charter pmbl.
212. G.A. Res. 217 (III), A Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl. (Dec. 10, 1948). 
213. The South African Constitution speaks of “[h]uman dignity, the achievement of equal-
ity and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.” CONST. OF REPUB. OF S. AFR., Oct.
11, 1996, ch. 1 § 1(a). The constitutions of Brazil, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua also include ref-
erences to “dignity,” whereas Canada and Israel have made dignitary concerns a constitu-
tional importance. Christopher A. Bracey, Dignity in Race Jurisprudence, 7 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 669, 682-83 (2005).
214. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 1, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.
de/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/E8PY-MUTT].
215. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Williams Lecraft v. Spain, ¶¶ 6.5, 7.3-.4, 9, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/96/D/1493/2006 (July 27, 2009), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/
files/decision-en_20090812.pdf [https://perma.cc/4S2E-WVAX].
216. Id. at ¶ 9.
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States similarly prohibits “torture or other cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading treatment or punishment.”217 The following Subsection
shows that the Court could also define the term “degrading treat-
ment” through dignity based on its well-established track record of
recognizing dignitary harms.
2. Defining “Degrading Treatment” Through the Court’s
“Dignity Jurisprudence” 218
A jus cogens norm prohibits “torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment.”219 Excluding a group of indi-
viduals on racial grounds is unlikely to be torture. It is also unlike-
ly that a U.S. court would deem it “punishment,” as the Supreme
Court has held that deportation—a deprivation220 of a larger set of
rights than exclusion—is not “punishment.”221 The Court, however,
cited the dissent of that same case over a hundred years later for
the seemingly opposite proposition, when it stated that “[w]e have
long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe ‘penalty.’”222
The Court has not defined the term “degrading treatment,” but
it is very familiar with the term “dignity.” Even though the term
“degrading treatment” figures within a larger expression of “cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,”223 suggesting
that the Court would limit its definition of the term to the Eighth
Amendment and prohibit only those acts barred by the Amend-
ment,224 references to “dignity” can be found across U.S. jurispru-
217. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
218. The term is borrowed from Bracey, supra note 213.
219. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702(d).
220. In the ordinary sense of the word and not within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
221. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
222. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 740
(Brewer, J., dissenting)).
223. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
224. The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In
Furman v. Georgia, Justice William Brennan stated in concurrence: “The primary principle
[of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment] is that a punish-
ment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings.” 408 U.S. 238,
271 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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dence. As early as 1944, Justice Frank Murphy in Korematsu v.
United States dissented as follows:
[The inference that] examples of individual disloyalty prove
group disloyalty[,] justify[ing] discriminatory action against the
entire group[,] ... has been used in support of the abhorrent and
despicable treatment of minority groups by the dictatorial
tyrannies which this nation is now pledged to destroy. To give
constitutional sanction to that inference ... is to adopt one of the
cruelest of the rationales used by our enemies to destroy the
dignity of the individual and to encourage and open the door to
discriminatory actions against other minority groups in the
passions of tomorrow.225
The Court’s analyses of legal issues involving race have often
included references to dignity. In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, Justice Arthur Goldberg discussed the purpose of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and stated: “Discrimination is not simply dollars
and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation, frustra-
tion, and embarrassment that a person must surely feel when he is
told that he is unacceptable as a member of the public because of his
race or color.”226
In the jury selection context, the Court has concluded that “racial
discrimination in the qualification or selection of jurors offends the
dignity of persons and the integrity of the courts.”227 At the cross-
section of criminal and immigration law, Justice Brennan portrayed
the discriminatory targeting of Mexican Americans at border con-
trols as an “affront to the dignity of American citizens of Mexican
ancestry and Mexican aliens.”228
More recently, the concept of dignity arguably played a central
role for marriage equality in Obergefell v. Hodges.229 Although
claims for marriage equality may differ from racial equality in im-
portant respects, the current Court’s use of specific concepts and
language can be instructive. Justice Anthony Kennedy, in discuss-
225. 323 U.S. 214, 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
226. 379 U.S. 241, 292 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting S. Rep. No. 88-872, at 16
(1964)).
227. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991).
228. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 573 n.4 (1976).
229. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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ing the harms same-sex couples suffer when excluded from mar-
riage, spoke of “stigma” and “humiliation” of the children of same-
sex couples,230 and the “demeaning,” “disrespect,” and “subordina-
tion” of gays and lesbians.231 He claimed that by bringing this case,
“[same-sex couples] ask[ed] for equal dignity in the eyes of the
law.”232
Based on the Court’s repeated use of the concept of dignity when
dealing with racial issues, it is unlikely that the Court would limit
its definition of “degrading treatment” by thinking solely in “Eighth
Amendment terms.”233 The bigger question is whether the Court
would consider exclusion of aliens as “treatment” at all. But if, as
discussed, the jus cogens norm prohibiting racial discrimination ex-
tends to admissions, and thus addresses the discrimination’s extra-
territorial effects,234 an exclusion necessarily assumes some kind of
“treatment.” If the Court extended jus cogens against race discrimi-
nation to admissions, it could also consider the discrimination as
“degrading treatment.”
III. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW MEETS CHAE CHAN PING AND
LIKES WHAT IT SEES
The Court’s reliance on international law to find racial exclusions
unlawful may seem like a “back-door” solution. It is to the extent
that the Court is generally reluctant to rely on international law,
and it has not had the option to consider racial exclusions since
1889.235 But it ultimately is not because the Court’s precedent in
Chae Chan Ping demands an international law analysis.
The Court’s source of authority in Chae Chan Ping can—counter-
intuitively—aid the current Court to justifiably further human
rights. Instead of clinging to the holding of Chae Chan Ping that
consistently justifies deference to political branches,236 the Court
should revisit the underlying law, the core of any precedent, and
230. Id. at 2600-01.
231. Id. at 2602-04. 
232. Id. at 2608.
233. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
234. See supra Part II.B.
235. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
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place it within the context of current international law to find race-
based exclusions unlawful. To bolster this argument, this Part first
discusses the authority of customary international laws within the
hierarchy of U.S. domestic law. It then examines the arguably
flawed, yet necessarily enduring, Chae Chan Ping Court’s source of
law—the concept of state sovereignty. And finally, this Part explains
how the Court can take advantage of Chae Chan Ping to invalidate
racial exclusions.
A. Customary International Law’s Authority in U.S. Courts
The Court declared more than a hundred years ago in The
Paquete Habana that customary international law is part of United
States law.237 The Court recognized in 1964 that customary inter-
national law is federal law,238 and customary international law has
been declared U.S. law within the meaning of Article III and the
Supremacy Clause.239 However, in 1986 the Eleventh Circuit relied
on dicta from The Paquete Habana to claim customary international
law as subordinate to a “‘controlling’ public act.”240 The Supreme
Court has neither reached nor justified such a conclusion as part of
an actual holding.241
In his article titled The Constitution and United States Sover-
eignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, Louis Hen-
kin adamantly argues in defense of customary international law’s
preeminent place in U.S. law’s hierarchy.242 Henkin responds to
those mistakenly asserting that customary international law is
inherently inferior to legislation because it is considered “common
law.”243 He then discusses why customary international law is su-
perior to U.S. domestic law.244 First, Henkin points out that the
Framers respected international law—both treaties and customary
237. See 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
238. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964); see also Henkin,
The Constitution and United States Sovereignty, supra note 26, at 140.
239. Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty, supra note 26, at 140.
240. See id. at 136 & n.91 (quoting Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-54 (11th Cir.
1986)).
241. Id. at 136.
242. Id. at 134-40.
243. Id. at 137-38.
244. Id. at 139.
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international law—and intended the political branches to abide by
it.245 In 1796, Justice James Wilson wrote, “When the United States
declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of
nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement.”246 The Court
echoed the relevance of this statement in 2004, quoting it in Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain.247 Chae Chan Ping from 1889 is also evidence
that the political branches are subject to international law.248
Second, while the Court has decided that the Supremacy Clause
subordinates treaties to subsequent congressional legislation, there
is no textual basis for subordinating customary international law.249
Third, customary international law is enduring and universal—an
idea that the Court has acknowledged.250 In the Head Money Cases,
one of the first cases in which the Court declared the supremacy of
subsequent congressional acts over treaties,251 the Court suggested
that the number of branches of government that contribute to the
formation of a law may determine that law’s place in the hierarchy
of U.S. law.252 International law, and much of it, existed before the
United States became a nation, and customary international law
forms according to the practice of many nations, including the Unit-
ed States.253
Henkin is not naïve: he admits that “[d]espite these arguments,
it is unlikely the Supreme Court will now distinguish customary
international law from treaties and declare the former supreme over
federal statutory law.”254 This Note agrees: it is unlikely that the
Court would invalidate a racial exclusion based on the supremacy
245. Id.
246. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson, J.); see also Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793) (“[T]he United States had, by taking a place among
the nations of the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations.”).
247. 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004).
248. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
249. See Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty, supra note 26, at 139;
see also U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”).
250. Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty, supra note 26, at 139.
251. Richard L. Doernberg, Treaty Override by Administrative Regulation: The Multiparty
Financing Regulations, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 521, 544-45 (1995).
252. See 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884); Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty,
supra note 26, at 136-37.
253. Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty, supra note 26, at 137.
254. Id. at 139.
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of customary international law. The Court’s political reluctance to
do so, however, need not render such a decision correct. But the
Court can avoid this broader issue. To find racial exclusions un-
lawful under international law, the Court need not conclude that all
customary international law is superior to U.S. law; it can do so
within the limits of Chae Chan Ping and stare decisis.255 To explain,
the following Sections first defend the Chae Chan Ping Court’s
theoretical basis and then explain its precedential value today.
B. Customary International Law as the First-Order Inquiry
As discussed in Part I.B, the Chae Chan Ping Court grounded the
United States’s exclusionary power in the concept of state sover-
eignty. The Court could have continued to rely on the Commerce
Clause to regulate immigration, as it did before Chae Chan Ping.256
Invoking state sovereignty as the legal basis instead, the Court
necessarily suggested that the United States’ power to exclude is
subject to international law.
Many international law scholars have criticized the concept of
sovereignty in the law,257 but admit that “[t]heory nevertheless dies
hard.”258 Professor Nafziger claims that because the concept of sov-
ereignty is an “international social function” subject to change, it
cannot be the basis for international law.259 But why not? Interna-
tional law itself is a social function. State sovereignty can act as a
foundation, or a benchmark, to a state’s exclusion power, subject to
certain limitations, as the world order changes. After all, sovereign-
ty—the existence of government over a clearly defined territory—is
part of the criteria for statehood.260 And statehood—a concept that
255. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
256. See Lindsay, supra note 12, at 40.
257. See JUSS, supra note 62, at 47-57.
258. Nafziger, supra note 29, at 822.
259. Id. at 819.
260. Article I of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States states: “The state as a
person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with
the other States.” Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art I, Dec. 26, 1933, 165
L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]. For a criticism of these criteria, see Thomas
D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and Its Discontents, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 403, 434-53 (1999).
2658 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2617
will similarly persist—is in turn dependent on other states.261 Inter-
national law, by definition a fluid construct that develops slowly,
must have certain benchmark concepts around which it can prog-
ress.
Professor Satvinder Singh Juss adamantly derides the concept
of sovereignty as a flawed, outdated doctrine used to justify politi-
cal dominance.262 Indeed, international law has changed on account
of continually expanding human rights recognition, and “[t]he chief
casualty is state sovereignty.”263 But the idea of a nation’s right to
self-determination as through state sovereignty will continue to en-
dure based on the engrained system of independent nation-states.264
No matter how flawed contemporary scholars deem the concept of
sovereignty to be, it is likely too “‘deeply rooted’ in ‘national sen-
timent and in the psychology of people,’” making it too difficult to
dispose of.265 A “brick-by-brick” approach will likely remain the only
avenue to advance human rights. As discussed earlier, the “wall of
sovereignty” is not impermeable266: the adoption of international
covenants restricting state rights presumed states’ willingness to
cede sovereignty.
The concept of a nation-state, along with its power to exclude, will
continue to prevail. However, the right to exclude whether outright
valid or undoubtedly relevant, is equally so in the United States as
well as other nation-states. The Court voiced this understanding in
1936 in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.: “As a member
of the family of nations, the right and power of the United States in
[foreign affairs] are equal to the right and power of the other
members of the international family. Otherwise, the United States
261. The fourth requirement for “statehood” requires a “capacity to enter into relations
with other [s]tates.” Montevideo Convention, supra note 260, art. I. That criterion has
received the most criticism. See Grant, supra note 260, at 434-35. However, some of the
possible criteria not listed in the Montevideo Convention—recognition, United Nations
membership, or external legality—nonetheless render the term “statehood” inherently
dependent. See id. at 450-51.
262. See JUSS, supra note 62, at 47.
263. Id. at 51.
264. Cf. id. at 52-53.
265. Id. at 48 (quoting Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 1, 43 (Apr.
9) (separate opinion by Alvarez, J.)).
266. See supra Part I.C.
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is not completely sovereign.”267 This idea holds even more weight in
the twenty-first century due to the ever-globalized world order.
A state’s power to exclude, along with that power’s limitations,
ought to be uniform across the international community to obtain
international cohesiveness. Indeed, states have become so finan-
cially interdependent268 that great deviations from particular inter-
nationally accepted norms or practices are detrimental to the state
with respect to diplomacy and economics.269 Conversely, trade is
what helps deter racial exclusions.270 Asians are now less vulnerable
to explicit discrimination due to Asia’s growing market, yet sub-
Saharan African citizens lack such “economic leverage.”271
A state’s exclusion of any group could even backfire if the inter-
national community chose to condemn rather than follow it, unlike
when the United States spearheaded the racial exclusion laws at
the turn of the twentieth century.272 For example, in January 2017,
when President Trump signed an executive order temporarily sus-
pending the entry of refugees and citizens from seven Muslim-
majority countries,273 other states felt unease.274 Countries included
in the ban called the order “insulting,” expressed “regret and aston-
ishment,” and deemed it “unfortunate.”275 The United Kingdom’s
leaders described the ban as “divisive and wrong,” “shameful and
cruel.”276 France, Turkey, and Canada openly declared to welcome
refugees, while Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany called Pres-
ident Trump to explain to him the United States’ obligations under
the Geneva Convention on refugees.277
267. 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
268. States have increasingly reached agreements liberalizing the movement of persons
and trade. See, e.g., Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47; Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2624
U.N.T.S. 223 (2007); North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
269. Rachel Brewster, Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace Reputational
Sanctions, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 259, 267-68 (2013).
270. FITZGERALD & COOK-MARTIN, supra note 166, at 345.
271. Id.
272. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
273. See Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017, 8:51 PM).
274. Azadeh Ansari et al., World Leaders React to Travel Ban, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017), http://
www.cnn.com/2017/01/30/politics/trump-travel-ban-world-reaction/index.html [https://perma.
cc/6Q4V-Q8NG].
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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An analysis of race discrimination in admissions under custom-
ary international law cannot ignore international community’s out-
rage due to states’ uniform and equal exclusionary powers implied
by the Court in Curtiss-Wright.278 Furthermore, the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States as an auth-
ority for jus cogens explicitly recognizes other states’ “official
statements of policy” as contributing to the formation of customary
international law.279
The enduring concept of sovereignty, together with the states’
necessarily equal exclusionary power, renders reliance on custom-
ary international law a first-order question in exclusions violating
human rights. While international law may also provide a “back-
ground norm for constitutional decisionmaking,”280 it first provides
an independent authority that checks a state’s power to exclude.
The following Section explains how the Court can use this authority
to find racial exclusions unlawful.
C. The Court’s Ability to Invalidate Racial Exclusions Under
Customary International Law
Chae Chan Ping held that immigration questions were nonjus-
ticiable, causing the judiciary to defer to the political branches.281
One of the main justifications for the Court’s deference is the fear
that the courts would risk “upsetting the delicate balance of re-
lations with other countries and ... undermining [of] national secu-
rity.”282 As Professor Peter Spiro points out, that risk is significantly
lower today than in the late nineteenth century.283 Considering race-
based exclusions and their high “diplomatic price,”284 the application
of the nondiscrimination principle to admissions would amount to
a minor intrusion into the political branches’ area of competency.
278. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
279. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (recognizing that the “[p]ractice of states” as the prong
of a two-part test establishing customary international law includes “official statements of
policy, whether they are unilateral or undertaken in cooperation with other states”).
280. Scaperlanda, supra note 26, at 1015.
281. See supra Part I.B.
282. Spiro, supra note 26, at 340.
283. Id.
284. FITZGERALD & COOK-MARTIN, supra note 166, at 345.
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But more importantly, the Court could justify its incursion by re-
lying on Chae Chan Ping to find race-based exclusions unlawful
under international law. As this Note has argued, the plenary pow-
er doctrine reflects international law norms. Through this lens, em-
bracing Chae Chan Ping and the evolving concept of sovereignty can
help counteract the outcomes it has thus far produced.285
International law is significantly different than what it was in
1889. As Part I.C discussed, the international community has gone
through an “individual international rights revolution” to the det-
riment of state sovereignty. But contrary to Michael Scaperlanda’s
posit in 1993 that “the fact of a more limited sovereignty vis a vis
the individual is crucial; the specific limitations are unimportant,”286
this Note has argued that specific limitations are important today.287
Additionally, customary international law has been formally au-
thoritative in U.S. courts only since the second half of the twenty-
first century.288 When addressing a racial exclusion today, the Court
can rely on not only precedent—Chae Chan Ping ’s recognition of
sovereignty as the cornerstone to states’ exclusionary powers and
the implicit incorporation of international law norms—but on the
development of customary international law as authority upon it.
A lingering question remains whether the Court would be willing
to revisit Chae Chan Ping. It is unlikely the Court would agree with
the theoretical basis, given the Court’s general reluctance to employ
international law in assessing domestic law.289 However, Chae Chan
Ping is unlike the death penalty cases, for example, in which the
Court has been divided in considering other states’ laws, let alone
their norms.290 But like the Eighth Amendment, Chae Chan Ping is
United States law, and state sovereignty as the still-valid rationale
for exclusions requires revisiting current international law norms.
When confronted with a racial exclusion, the Court should revisit
Chae Chan Ping, respect its legal basis, and redefine it to reflect
current international law and its limitations. In doing so, the Court
285. See supra Part III.A-B.
286. Scaperlanda, supra note 26, at 1015.
287. See supra Parts II.B-C.
288. See supra Part III.A.
289. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting
the majority’s claim that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world).
290. See id.
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can both satisfy its obligation to stare decisis and refuse deference
to the political branches.
CONCLUSION
This Note argued that the plenary power doctrine reflects inter-
national law norms, which the Court must consider when analyzing
a racial exclusion. The Chae Chan Ping Court grounded the plen-
ary power doctrine in the concept of state sovereignty. While the
power to exclude by virtue of sovereignty has lost some of its force
through the twentieth century, it will continue to endure.291 The
emergence of international human rights has and will continue to
develop against the backdrop of entrenched concepts of the nation-
state and national self-determination.292 But today, international
law prohibits race discrimination in admissions.293 By relying on
Chae Chan Ping and current international law, the Court may re-
fuse deference to the other branches and find racial exclusions
unlawful in accordance with stare decisis.294 A theory formulated on
international law and Chae Chan Ping—a case persistently deemed
racist in itself—can thus further human rights in this narrow set of
cases.295 At the very least, it has a better chance than the never-
failing plenary power doctrine. Although aliens will continue to have
no right to enter the United States, they nonetheless “ask for equal
dignity in the eyes of the law.”296 International law grants them that
right.
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